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Abstract
This article shows that planning for the organization of EU banking regulation and supervision did
not just appear on the agenda in recent years with discussions over the creation of the eurozone
banking union. It unveils a hitherto neglected initiative of the European Commission in the
1960s and early 1970s. Drawing on extensive archival work, this article explains that this initiative,
however, rested on a number of different assumptions, and emerged in a much different context. It
ﬁrst explains that the Commission’s initial project was not crisis-driven; that it articulated the link
between monetary integration and banking regulation; and ﬁnally that it did not set out to move the
supervisory framework to the supranational level, unlike present-day developments.
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Introduction
While many developments occurred in the 1990s and 2000s (Quaglia, 2010, 2007), the
2007–8 ﬁnancial crisis and the current challenges of the eurozone have given much more
immediate relevance to the issue of banking regulation and supervision in the single
currency area (Hennessy, 2014). Today, three main elements are nested under the umbrella
term of ‘banking union’: regulation (single rulebook), supervision (single supervisory
mechanism or SSM) and resolution (single resolution mechanism or SRM). Using the
parlance of the 1960s, the three elements of today’s banking union correspond1 , mutatis
mutandis, to the harmonization of the European Economic Community (EEC)’s member
states’ banking legislations, the co-operation of supervisory authorities, and winding-up
procedures. In 1965, the European Commission launched a series of discussions and
negotiations about the co-ordination and eventual harmonization of the banking legislations
of the EEC member states, with the hope to produce a single all-encompassing directive on
the topic, covering all pillars except supervision. Confronted with strong opposition from
new member states (chieﬂy Britain) as well as the impossibility of reaching agreement
à six, the Commission changed its tactics in 1973 and adopted a step-by-step approach,
focusing on individual directives, more modest in scope. This new approach eventually
led to the various directives that have been enacted since then.
*Earlier versions of this article were presented at Bruegel, the Columbia Law School and the Economic and Social History
Seminar at the University of Glasgow. I wish to thank the participants for their feedback, and in particular Éric Monnet,
Katharina Pistor, Angela Romano, Catherine Schenk, Shahin Vallée, Nicolas Véron, as well as the anonymous reviewers
for their comments and suggestions. This research was supported by ESRC RES-062-23-2423 and my Lord Kelvin Adam
Smith Fellowship at the University of Glasgow.
1 Depending on deﬁnitions, deposit insurance is also sometimes included as a separate pillar of banking union.
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The literature on the development of international and European ﬁnancial regulation
and supervision since 1945 does not mention this episode, focusing instead mostly on
the emergence of the BCBS (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision) framework, in
spite of a few limited references to the EEC story through the ‘Groupe de contact’ of
banking supervisors (Goodhart, 2011; Singer, 2007; Wood, 2005). Traditional long-term
accounts of European integration do not mention this episode either, whether those
adopting a general approach (Dinan, 2004 and 2006; Gilbert, 2012; Moravcsik, 1998;
Varsori, 2010), or those focused on ﬁnancial and monetary co-operation (Dyson, 1994;
Dyson and Featherstone, 1999; James, 2012a; MacNamara, 1998; Ungerer, 1997). While
each of the elements of the banking union have been studied by a large body of literature
(De Rynck, 2016; Enoch et al., 2014; Gros and Schoenmaker, 2014; Howarth and
Quaglia, 2013; Posner and Véron, 2010; Quaglia, 2013; Véron, 2015), including deposit
insurance (Fratianni, 1995; Ayadi and Lastra, 2010; Schoenmaker and Gros, 2012) and
the issue of resolution (Kudrna, 2012; Schoenmaker, 2012), these works never mention
the high ambitions of the Commission in the 1960s–70s with which this article will deal.
There is a common view in the social science literature that the development of European
banking regulation and supervision really started only after the 1986 SEA (Single
European Act) and the subsequent legislation passed on the topic.
This view is understandable, since the ambitious plans presented by the Commission in
the 1960s and early 1970s were premature and by and large failed. Perhaps most impor-
tantly, the context changed to such an extent in half a century that, at ﬁrst sight, looking
back to the 1960s does not seem relevant: the EEC of the 1960s was not ﬁnancially
integrated, the banking systems of its member states were very different and it did not
share a single currency. The Commission’s projects in the 1960s–70s were just a few
pages in length; recent comparable regulations cover hundreds of pages. To be clear, this
article does not argue that the two moments are equivalent. If the plans of the Commission
in the 1960s were indeed very ambitious, they never set out, for political reasons, to create
a single supranational supervisor in the EEC, like today’s SSM. Some of the issues at
stake are also very different, given how much the context has changed. One of the main
goals of today’s banking union is to delink the sovereigns and the banks; this was of
course not so much of an issue in the 1960s, in a Europe where levels of government
deﬁcit and debt were incomparably lower if not nonexistent.
Recent developments in the eurozone have also revived the debate about the link
between monetary integration and banking regulation/supervision. It is commonplace
to say that the euro suffers from a number of initial design failures, and in particular
the absence of a common supervisory and regulatory framework. The Maastricht Treaty
negotiations famously sidestepped these issues (James, 2012a, pp. 292, 313–17). This
article examines this question by exploring a time frame – the 1960s and 1970s – when
both monetary integration and the harmonization regulation/supervision were intensely
discussed, and sometimes even explicitly linked to each other.
In doing so, this article is part of an ongoing wider effort to show how economic history
can shed light on present-day policy-making (James, 2012b). In the past few years, a range
of articles and books have linked previous developments to contemporary challenges, in
particular by looking at two phases: the inter-war period, to explore the lessons that can
be drawn from the Great Depression/gold standard analogy (Bholat, 2014; Bordo and
James, 2010; Eichengreen, 2015), and the development of European monetary co-operation
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since the 1960s, to investigate the root causes of some contemporary disagreements and the
origins of EMU’s (economic and monetary union’s) design failures (Eichengreen, 2012;
James, 2012a; Mourlon-Druol, 2014). As David Bholat puts it, ‘the past is a rich resource
that can be exploited for precedents or alternative possibilities to the contemporary
conventional wisdom, giving pause for policy-makers to reﬂect on why an issue perceived
as a problem today was non-problematic or differently problematic in the past’ (Bholat,
2014, p. 172). Harold James explains that ‘history (…) tells us multiple equilibria stories’
(James, 2012b, p. 1025). The case study analysed in this article typically follows that
template, as it investigates similar discussions to those of the present day seen in a different
context, with different results and, most interestingly, different assumptions.
This article uses the classic historical methodology of trying to understand the different
sort of paths that the development of European banking regulation and supervision could
have taken through a systematic exploration of unpublished primary source material. This
article is based on a wide range of hitherto unexploited primary sources from the European
Commission, the Bank of England, the Bank of France and the UK National Archives.
These documents contain detailed verbatim accounts of meetings and multiple
administrative notes detailing the policy-makers’ intentions, interpretations, and reactions.
The varied nature of this corpus of primary sources helped to cross-check the unfolding of
events as well as the scope and nature of the plans discussed.
The recent endeavour to create a eurozone banking union is often presented as an
unprecedented step; this article contends that this is not the case, and compares and
contrasts this effort with an earlier plan of the European Commission to harmonize
European banking regulation and supervision. This article ﬁrst examines the plans that
the European Commission started devising in the 1960s, their aims, and the Commis-
sion’s strategy to implement them. It then explores the Commission’s motivations, and
underscores how strikingly different they were from present-day preoccupations. It ﬁnally
highlights the historical innovation that moving the European supervisory framework to
the supranational level represents, in contrast to what the plans of the Commission set
out in the 1960s and 1970s. This article focuses on banking regulation and supervision,
which, as Quaglia notes (Quaglia, 2007), was much more developed than other ﬁnancial
services (insurance and securities). Taken together, these three aspects help shed light on
current developments by re-framing them in a longer-term perspective.
I. A Banking Union Before a Monetary Union
There is a common view in the literature according to which international banking regula-
tion and supervision discussions started with the emergence of the BCBS framework in
the mid-1970s (Kapstein, 1989; Schoenmaker, 2013); this view suggests that in an EU con-
text, they only started after the 1986 Single European Act, and the subsequent liberalization
of capital movements (Bach and Newman, 2007; Jabko, 2006; Posner, 2007). If Goodhart
does refer to the EEC-centred ‘Dondelinger group’, or Groupe de Contact, as a forerunner
to the BCBS, he does not detail the ﬁrst discussions on the topic that the European Commis-
sion initiated in the mid-1960s (Goodhart, 2011). The ﬁrst and second banking directives
(1973 and 1977, respectively) are sometimes mentioned, mostly in legal studies (Dragomir,
2010; Louis, 1995). Both of these biases - the near-exclusive focus on Basel and post-1986
EEC developments - are certainly justiﬁable. Basel became the centre of attention in the
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following decades and outlined the most inﬂuential regulatory framework; while the most
important EU directives were only enacted after 1986. A corollary to this BCBS focus is
the view that international regulatory/supervisory co-ordination essentially derives from a
non-binding set of informal rules, instead of a formal, written, legal framework
(Schoenmaker, 2013, pp. 8–9) that is more typical of what the EU produces. In order to
qualify these views, this ﬁrst section sets out the content of the project that the Commission
devised in the 1960s–70s – exposed in a written, legal framework – and the reasons behind it
– EEC-centred instead of global.
The 1960s and early 1970s witnessed intense discussions about European ﬁnancial
integration, supervision, and regulation. The European Commission was the prominent
steering force behind these discussions (Maes, 2006). It commissioned a group of experts
chaired by Claudio Segré, Director for Studies in the Commission’s Directorate-General
for Economic and Financial Affairs, to study ‘the problems confronting the capital markets
of the Community as a result of implementation of the Rome Treaty’ (Segré, 1966, p. 5;
Maes, 2007, pp. 29–31). A corollary to debates about the creation of ‘a European common
market for capital’was the regulation and supervision of that hoped-for integrated ﬁnancial
market. Chapter 12 of the report speciﬁcally mentioned the need to further co-ordinate
national legislations in banking regulation and supervision, as the discrepancies between
them were considered to hinder the realization of a common market for capital. The Segré
Report thus provided the ﬁrst theoretical foundations for the entire discussions.
A web of committees and working groups was then created in order to start discussing
the possibility of co-ordinating, with a view to eventual harmonization of, the banking
regulation/supervision legislations of the EEC member states (Clarotti, 1982). A group
named ‘Coordination of Banking Legislations’ was created for that purpose in 1969.
The Commission’s ambitions were very high, as it planned to harmonize all EEC member
states’ regulatory frameworks in one directive – in short, what would be dubbed today a
single rulebook. In July 1972, Wilhelm Haferkamp, the European Commissioner then in
charge of the discussions, wrote a draft directive on the co-ordination of legislative,
regulatory and administrative dispositions concerning the access to the non-stipendiary
activities of credit institutions and their exercise (Commission, 1972). The Commission’s
ideas concerned all sorts of issues related to banking regulation and supervision, including
authorization procedures (section II, Articles 2 to 6), creation of branches (section III,
Articles 7 to 9), ratios (solvency, liquidity, proﬁtability – section IV, Articles 14 to 17),
deposit insurance (article 18), activities of foreign banks in the EEC and of EEC banks
abroad, credit information exchange/‘centrale des risques’ (that is, mutual information
about large loans, article 20), and winding-up procedures and withdrawal of authorization
(section VIII, Articles 24 to 27).
This project was transmitted to current member states as well as applicant countries (that
is, Britain, Denmark and Ireland). When the Coordination of Banking Legislations group
met up again in October 1972, applicant states took part in the meetings. But faced with
the impossibility of reaching a compromise after 21 meetings of governmental experts from
1969 to late 1973, including the last eight with the nine member states, the Commission de-
cided to change its strategy. The last eight sessions highlighted in particular the impossibility
of reaching an agreement between the experts of the original member states and those of the
new members. The key problem stemmed from the fact that Britain (and to a lesser extent
Denmark) did not have developed formal, written banking legislation. In particular, the
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discussions over the system of preliminary authorization to access banking activities posed
problems, as no such system existed in Britain at all, by contrast to those already in force in
some other EECmember states. Britain had by far the most developed banking system of the
EEC, and the British government showed no readiness to change what it considered to be a
highly successful system. An ofﬁcial at the Bank of England thus commented on the
Commission’s draft directive: ‘As it stands, there is virtually no article which we can readily
accept in its present form. The whole philosophy of the directive is, of course, diametrically
opposed to our system of informal supervision and it is difﬁcult to see how the present text
can be amended to accommodate it’.2
When reading the records of the various meetings held about the topic in the different
branches of the British administration – the Treasury, the Bank of England – but also
beyond the government, such as those of the British Bankers Association (Sargent,
1982), one realizes the panic that the Commission’s plan spurred in London. ‘There can
be little doubt that the detailed regulatory system advocated in Brussels would destroy
London’s advantages’, wrote a British Treasury ofﬁcial, commenting on the Commis-
sion’s directive.3 The Commission then suggested the abandonment of the ‘global
approach’ to the co-ordination of banking legislation – an approach that was meant to
harmonize the EEC member states’ banking regulatory framework in one directive. It
suggested instead a step-by-step approach – more modest but hopefully more effective
– which would spread the burden of the gradual harmonization/co-ordination of the
various systems across multiple successive directives.
II. Thinking Banking Regulation Beyond Crisis-driven Agendas
Another widespread view in the literature presents the development of international and
European banking regulation and supervision as merely the product of a crisis-driven
agenda. The banking crises of the mid-1970s, such as the failure of the West German bank
Herstatt, or later the South American debt crises of the 1980s, prompted concerns about
international ﬁnancial stability that led to some regulatory/supervisory reactions. In short,
the development of international/European regulation and supervision of banks proceeded
ex post, not ex ante. This view is, again, largely conﬁrmed by the developments since the
1970s: the banking crises of the mid-1970s led to the creation of the BCBS, and the 2007
ﬁnancial crisis/eurozone sovereign debt crisis led to the creation of a eurozone banking
union. Yet this should not obscure the fact that the European Commission and the EEC
member states did discuss, as early as the 1960s, the possibility of harmonizing their
supervisory and regulatory frameworks – but, interestingly, for entirely different reasons.
The search for ﬁnancial stability – the most standard motivation for developing bank-
ing regulation/supervision – appeared relatively late, towards the mid-1970s: that is,
nearly a decade after the ﬁrst discussions had begun in the EEC. The introductory parts
of reports or speeches on the topic started mentioning it en passant. This motivation was
of course linked to the ﬁnancial context. Among the various ﬁnancial innovations/crises
that spurred the debate about international regulation/supervision were the rise of the
2 Archive of the Bank of England (thereafter BoE), 8A48/4, Unsigned note, Draft Directive on the Harmonisation of
Supervision over Credit Institutions, 19 September 1972.
3 The National Archives, UK (thereafter TNA), T 233/2525, Seammen to Unwin, EEC directive on the coordination of
banking legislation, 25 June 1973.
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unregulated euromarkets from the 1950s–60s onwards (Schenk, 1998), the international
banking crises of 1974–5 (Schenk, 2014) and especially the collapse of Bankhaus Herstatt
(Mourlon-Druol, 2015). Events in the banking sector, especially in the foreign exchange
and eurocurrency markets, called for measures to be taken in the co-ordination of banking
legislations. EEC ﬁnance ministers stressed this during a meeting on 18 November 1974,
and the European Commission highlighted this as well when it proposed the further strength-
ening of co-ordination among European supervisory authorities: ‘A meaningful step should
be taken without delay […] The proposed decision should make it possible to compare
without delay the practices of the various authorities and to begin discussion between these
authorities and the Commission with a view to developing urgently appropriate measures
to improve the ﬁnancial security of credit institutions (liquidity, solvency), and in particular
of those active on the euro-markets’ (Commission, 1974). All these crises, sometimes
explicitly mentioned in the discussions and sometimes not, created a sense that international
co-operation on these matters ought to be improved. This also raised the ambiguity, limits
and pitfalls of an exclusively EEC-centred approach confronted with issues that were
global in nature, as I will come back to in more detail below.
Yet the two most important reasons why the Commission put this issue on the agenda in
the 1960s were related to the creation of a common market in banking and the link with
potential monetary integration. Unlike in other EEC policy areas, such as, most famously,
agriculture and currency relations (Knudsen, 2009; Dyson, 1994), the co-ordination of
banking legislations had some detailed grounding in the Treaties of Rome, although there
was no standalone chapter entitled ‘ﬁnancial integration’ (Maes, 2007). If this certainly could
not predict its eventual realization, it however explains why the European Commission seized
the topic so quickly. Attempts at co-ordinating banking legislation were based on provisions
related to the right of establishment and the free movements of services and capital –
especially Articles 54 (freedom of establishment), 57 and 61 (liberalization of banking
activities) of the Treaty. In that sense, debates about the supervision and regulation of banks
at EEC level have to be seen in the perspective of the creation of a common market for
banking, and even more generally of European ﬁnancial integration.4 As the Segré Report
indicated, disparities in supervision and regulation across the EEC could be considered as
obstacles preventing access to the European market. Christopher Tugendhat, the British
Commissioner in charge of the discussions after Haferkamp, articulated this reasoning very
well: ‘Let us imagine a situation in which complete freedom of operation existed throughout
the Community for loans, deposits, the issuing of securities and investment. In these circum-
stances there would be a clear need, in the interest of the protection of savings and for the sake
of orderly market conditions, for some kind of common regulatory framework’ (Tugendhat,
1981). This explains why discussions, after the abandonment of the ‘global approach’,
focused on very technical matters – that is, the elimination of restrictions to the freedom of
establishment in the banking sector that was the object of the 1973 directive.
III. Linking EU Monetary Integration and Banking Regulation and Supervision
The EU’s quest for monetary integration provided a second important motivation for
harmonizing banking regulation and supervision in the EEC. The theoretical link between
4 Historical Archives of the European Commission (thereafter HAEC), BAC 244/1996 No.278, Compte-rendu de la
première réunion du groupe de travail ‘coordination des législations bancaires’, 23-24 June 1969.
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monetary integration and the harmonization of banking regulation and supervision comes
from the fact that for monetary integration to happen, the free circulation of capital and
the integration of ﬁnancial markets would have to be achieved. A single ﬁnancial market
and a single monetary policy would have to imply, sooner rather than later, a common
ﬁnancial regulatory and supervisory framework. British Treasury ofﬁcial Brian Unwin
thus acknowledged in 1972, shortly prior to UK entry, that ‘some coordination of banking
law is at least a logical concomitant of monetary union’.5
The disconnect observable in the 1990s and 2000s between the development of
European monetary integration (that eventually led to the creation of the euro) and that
of banking regulation/supervision (that only really took off from 2012) was not manifest
in the EEC of the 1960s–70s. At the time of the introduction of the euro, Padoa-Schioppa
underlined the ‘novelty [represented by] the abandonment of the coincidence between the
area of jurisdiction of monetary policy and the area of jurisdiction of banking supervision’
(Padoa-Schioppa, 1999). Back in the late 1970s and early 1980s, some European policy-
makers had however very clearly articulated the process of monetary integration with
what was then called ‘the harmonization of banking legislations’.
The very ﬁrst discussions about European monetary co-operation and integration in the
1950s and 1960s did not really tackle the issue, however (Warlouzet, 2011). The various
proposals set out by European Commissioner Robert Marjolin in the ﬁrst half of the 1960s
did not tackle the issue of banking regulation and supervision, but dealt instead with
monetary co-operation and macroeconomic policy co-ordination. The Barre memoranda
of February 1968 and then February 1969, which partly tried to revive the debate initiated
by Marjolin, followed the same template. Barre’s thinking unfolded in three steps, which
did not cover banking regulation and supervision: convergence of mid-term national
economic orientations ﬁrst, then concertation of short-term economic policies, and ﬁnally
the creation of a mechanism for monetary co-operation. This situation may have simply
reﬂected the fact that, at the time, capital movements were still restricted, and the principal
motivation behind the harmonization of banking regulation and supervision was the cre-
ation of a common market in banking, not cross-border ﬁnancial stability and the creation
of a single currency.
The next important moment in the discussions about monetary integration in Europe,
the 1970 Werner Report that set out a plan for the realization of economic and monetary
union, gave a ﬁrst hint at the link between banking regulatory/supervisory issues and
monetary integration. While it did not feature prominently, the Werner Report however in-
cluded a remark explaining that ‘As regards the structural aspect [of the coordination of
policies in relation to ﬁnancial markets], it is necessary to carry out measures of “technical”
harmonization in a series of ﬁelds, as for example regulations governing the activities of
credit institutions and institutional investors, the notiﬁcation and protection of holders of
securities, conditions for the operation of stock exchanges, the encouragement of saving
and certain forms of investment, and the legal instruments of ﬁnancial transactions’
(Werner, 1970, pp. 20–1). Still in 1970, a meeting between Commission ofﬁcials and
representatives of the EBF (European Banking Federation) also highlighted this link.
A number of EBF representatives noted that the absence of harmonization of legislation
5 TNA, T 233/2522, Unwin to Downey, EEC directive on the coordination of the law on credit institutions, 19 September
1972.
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had, so far, not created problems, and thus wondered whether co-ordination was at all
necessary. Ivo Schwartz, head of the directorate of banking and insurance in the
Commission’s DG XIV, replied that co-ordination may not seem necessary immediately,
but was in the long term. Schwartz identiﬁed two reasons: the need to eliminate discrim-
ination (hence related to the idea of a common market in banking), and the creation of
‘the conditions of a monetary union taking into account the banking dimension’.6
The context changed more radically in the course of the 1970s. The creation of the
European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979 provided weight to the theoretical argument
that monetary co-operation and banking harmonization should move at similar pace
(Mourlon-Druol, 2012). In a meeting with senior ofﬁcials of the member states’ regula-
tory and supervisory bodies in Brussels, Tugendhat used the EMS as a further reason for
moving forward: ‘There is the close relation between this ﬁeld [banking harmonization]
and the wider issue of the EMS. It would be easier to implement a common monetary
policy if we had banking systems supervised according to equivalent common standards,
and eventually of similar structures. Moreover, to the extent to which EMS gives rise to
more capital liberalisation, we have to make sure to be able to monitor the actors in this
forthcoming common capital market, i.e. the European credit institutions, on the basis of
equivalent rules’.7 Similarly, an internal note of the Commission explained: ‘It will be
important to bear in mind the relationship between banking integration and progress
towards economic and monetary union. EMU will involve not only convergence in the
ﬁeld of monetary policy but also movement towards the integration of structures and
the institutional arrangements of the banking sector. We must guard against a situation
in which the momentum towards EMU is held up because the necessary underlying work
on the institutional side has not been accomplished’.8 The governor of the Bank of Italy,
Paolo Bafﬁ, made a comparable reﬂection to that to Paulo Clarotti, head of division in
the European Commission, when the two talked about this subject in September 1978
in Rome.9 A Commission report published in 1982 is even more fascinating to read
today, as it describes what did not happen – or, at least, what took much longer than ex-
pected to happen: ‘The overall priority to be given to future work in the ﬁeld of banking
coordination will undoubtedly depend on progress towards monetary integration in the
Community. […] Assuming that the system [EMS] is maintained and even strengthened,
it seems fair to expect that it will lead to a situation where a gradual abolition of
remaining obstacles to capital movements can be set in motion. It goes without saying
that such a situation, in which cross-frontier banking services will come to play a much
bigger role than now, will call for an accompanying increase in the intensity of cooper-
ation between supervisory authorities of Member States, and will exert a strong pressure
for coordination of supervisory procedures and instruments in the Community’.10
6 HAEC, BAC 244/1996 n°278, Compte-rendu de la réunion d’information avec la fédération bancaire de la CEE, 5 March
1970.
7 HAEC, 223/1997 No.3, Record of the meeting of senior ofﬁcials of the Member States in the ﬁeld of banking legislation
and bank supervision held in Brussels on 7 December 1978.
8 HAEC, 223/1997 No.3, Commission, The common market in the banking sector: policies and work programme,
XV/141/78.
9 HAEC, 223/1997 No.3, Compte-rendu de mission de P. Clarotti, Entretien avec le gouverneur de la Banque d’Italie à
Rome, 7 September 1978.
10 HAEC, 223/1997 No.13, Commission, A Community work programme for the banking sector: situation and prospects,
XV/59/82 Rev.1.
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Interestingly, the link between monetary integration and ‘banking union’ was drawn
within the Commission’s circles or in the various committee structures discussing
banking regulation and supervision, but not during debates about monetary co-operation
and integration themselves (James, 2012a; Mourlon-Druol, 2012).
The Commission’s project of the 1960s–70s was, however, difﬁcult to realize. Cross-
border banking in the EEC was not sufﬁciently developed to necessitate the harmonization
of banking legislations. The high diversity of European ﬁnancial systems, in turn, made such
harmonization very difﬁcult. The very ﬁrst topic of discussion tackled by the Committee on
the co-ordination of banking legislation in 1969 was as basic as the deﬁnition of what actually
constituted a bank.11 In a meeting of the Banking Advisory Committee in 1978, the Danish
delegation noted that ‘the banking structure of each country was heavily dependent on the
country’s overall economic structure and could therefore be changed only slowly and
gradually’.12 In some member states, banking supervision and prudential instruments were
much used in monetary policy-making (Monnet, 2014). The need for the European
Commission to call for the assistance of multiple expert groups was a direct consequence
of the high diversity of systems in the EEC (Clarotti, 1988, p. 154). Experts were there to
assist the Commission in its endeavours, if not EEC member states individually, since each
of them knew actually very little about each other’s regulatory and supervisory framework.
In the same 1978 meeting, the Danish delegation thus further added that ‘it would welcome
documentation on banking legislation and the operation of the banking system in each coun-
try’(!)13 In addition, and contrary to the Commission’s thinking, the banks themselves did not
seem to be taking differences in banking legislation as a signiﬁcant obstacle to cross-border
operations. As mentioned above, as early as 1970 the EBF expressed doubts about the need
to co-ordinate banking legislation in the EEC. Similarly, at the same meeting of the Banking
Advisory Committee in 1978, the German delegation reported that ‘from the viewpoint of the
banking industry there were no major legal obstacles to transnational activities’.14
The disconnect between monetary integration and banking regulation and supervision
which was evident from the euro’s creation until the creation of the banking union in 2012
should therefore not be retrospectively taken for granted, as is commonly the case in the
literature and contemporary debates. This disconnect ﬁrst emerged at the time of the
creation of the EMS, when it became clear that the evolution of both ﬁelds were not going
hand in hand: the Commission’s plans for a ‘banking union’ had failed, or at least their
ambition had been considerably reduced, while currency relations were back at the top
of the agenda with the return of France, Italy and Ireland to the EEC common exchange
rate system.
IV. The Historical Innovation of Introducing a European Supranational Supervisor
However ambitious they were, the plans of the European Commission set out in the
1960s–70s did not envisage the move of the supervisory framework to the supranational
11 HAEC, BAC 244/1996 No.278, Compte-rendu de la première réunion du groupe de travail “coordination des législations
bancaires” tenue les 23 et 24 juin 1969.
12 HAEC, 223/1997 No.2, Record of the meeting of senior ofﬁcials of the Member States in the ﬁeld of banking legislation
and bank supervision held in Brussels on 7 December 1978.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
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level. In that sense, the creation of the SSM in 2014 represents a major historical novelty.
The introduction of an EEC supranational supervisory system whereby member states’
governments would have delegated their supervisory powers to an EEC-wide authority
seemed unthinkable in the 1960s and 1970s. An internal note of the European Commission
reads: ‘The most far-reaching solution in EC banking supervision would consist in planning
for a European control authority; this, however, has for political reasons never been
proposed. The coordination plans have at all times (even in the comprehensive 1972 Draft
Directive) aimed for cooperation of the supervisory bodies but, of course, with a view to
giving them authority to deal with individual cases of day-to-day banking control’.15 About
ten years later, in 1983, Tugendhat noted: ‘[The Commission] has no intention of
introducing a Community supervisory authority and with it another tier of bureaucracy’
(Tugendhat, 1983). As explained above, the supervisory/regulatory agenda of these years
was not as crisis-driven as it would later become, which may explain the reluctance of
the European Commission, any other political considerations aside, to suggest the
setting-up of a full-ﬂedged supranational supervisory framework.
The Commission never dared to propose the creation of a single, EEC-wide entity
for supervision that is central to today’s situation; it suggested instead to improve
the co-ordination among EEC supervisory authorities. This was a key purpose of the
second banking directive that created the BAC (Banking Advisory Committee). The
BAC was composed of high-ranking ofﬁcials from the banking control authorities of
the EEC member states and the Commission. In presenting the draft directive,
vice-president of the European Commission Henri Simonet explained that ‘the question
is not only to harmonise texts, but also and above all to harmonise mentalities. The existence
of a Committee will allow these authorities to periodically confront their ideas and
their conceptions concerning problems of common interest and should facilitate this
rapprochement of mentalities, necessary preliminary to the rapprochement of legislations
and practices that the Commission should pursue’.16 A few years later, a Commission
ofﬁcial further explained that ‘the Community still lack[ed] machinery for strategic and long
term thinking and advice, and it is this role which the advisory committee must perform’.17
Tugendhat, however, seemed to be aware that the situation could require a more
ambitious move in the future. When talking about the mutual recognition of winding-up
procedures, Tugendhat explained that ‘such arrangements had their use in that, with closer
integration of banking systems, for example where a bank had branches in several Member
States, crisis management at European level was necessary and could contribute towards the
stability of a common market in banking. However, this question did not rank very high in
the order of priorities’.18 In the same 1983 speech quoted earlier, and after having explained
that the Commission did not want to introduce an EEC supervisory authority, Tugendhat
added: ‘But it is important to bear in mind that the swift changes we can expect in European
15 HAEC, BAC 223/1997 No.3, Note, Position and role of the advisory committee (Art. 11 of the ﬁrst coordination direc-
tive), unsigned, undated, presumably early 1973-4.
16 BAC 94/1985, n°99, Communication de M. Simonet, Proposition d’une directive du Conseil visant à la coordination des
dispositions législatives, réglementaires et administratives concernant l’accès à l’activité des établissements de crédit et son
exercice, 28 November 1974.
17 HAEC, 223/1997 No.3, Note unsigned, The committee structure in the banking ﬁeld – role and procedures of the
advisory committee, XV/323/78-EN.
18 HAEC, BAC 223/1997 n°2, Record of the meeting of senior ofﬁcials of the Member States in the ﬁeld of banking
legislation and bank supervision held in Brussels on 7 December 1978.
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banking markets in the years to come do require similarly rapid adjustments on the part of
the prudential authorities if the same quality of supervision is to be maintained with a bigger
element of international business, and these rearrangements can only be realized at
Community level’ (Tugendhat, 1983). The British Commissioner therefore clearly linked
the evolution of the EEC’s supervisory institutional framework to the degree of integration
of Europe’s ﬁnancial markets. Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, then Director-General of the
Economic and Financial Affairs Division at the European Commission, had reasoned
similarly in 1982, when he said: ‘To the extent to which there therefore is a need for control
and supervision, the question arises of determining the appropriate level at which they
should be exercised, and in this regard there is a solid case for operating them at a
Community level: the EEC could in this regard be seen as constituting an optimum
regulation area’ (Padoa-Schioppa, 1982).
Yet in the 1970s the EEC did not represent such an optimum regulation area. The bank-
ing crises of the mid-1970s involved an international dimension, but one that went beyond
the EEC’s borders. The failure of Bankhaus Herstatt highlighted the need for co-ordination
across the Atlantic, the Israel–British Bank involved transactions between a London subsid-
iary and the head ofﬁce in Tel Aviv, and the Lloyds Lugano banking scandal happened in
the Swiss branch of the British bank (Mourlon-Druol, 2015; Schenk, 2014). In all three of
these cases, intergovernmental co-operation was more necessary at the BCBS/BIS level than
at the EEC level. The mere creation of the BAC in the second half of the 1970s proved to be
difﬁcult because of the possible overlap in the various committee structures that had
emerged in the 1970s. In commenting on the EEC Council of ministers’ lack of enthusiasm
at the emergence of the BAC, a Commission ofﬁcial explained that ‘this was almost
certainly partly due to the fact that at that moment another Committee had been created in
Basel within the framework of the Group of Ten’.19 More generally, the further expansion
of committees and their accompanying bureaucracy raised little enthusiasm.With the beneﬁt
of hindsight, it is interesting to read the then head of the French Treasury, Jacques de
Larosière, commenting: ‘Such a bureaucracy [the Banking Advisory Committee] seems
useless to us and even harmful due to the temptations to hegemony that they would not miss
to develop. In addition, it would duplicate the cooperation that already exists between the
central bank governors’.20 Incidentally, the institutional context of the time made a treaty
change necessary for a new EEC supervisor to be a supranational body. Today, by contrast,
the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU provides the legal basis of the banking union with
Articles 114 and 127(6) (Véron, 2015).
Conclusions
The European Commission’s plans in the 1960s represent an interesting if unsuccessful
attempt at setting a regulatory/supervisory framework ex ante, rather than ex post. The fact
that such plans were thought of as early as in the 1960s contradicts the widely held belief that
European policy-makers never thought about regulation and supervision when devising
plans for monetary integration. The Commission’s thinking in the 1960s shows that some
19 HAEC, 223/1997 No.3, Note unsigned, The committee structure in the banking ﬁeld – role and procedures of the
advisory committee, XV/323/78-EN.
20 Archives historiques de la Banque de France, 1357200901/98, de Larosière to Barre/Boulin, Visite de M. Tugendhat,
10 June 1977. My translation.
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European policy-makers clearly articulated ﬁnancial integration, banking regulation/super-
vision and monetary integration all together – albeit that the proposals did not go through.
The strategy, of course, radically changed in the late 1980s, when the European Commission
decided to prioritize capital liberalization over the harmonization of prudential regulations.
The 1980s witnessed a progressive change of orthodoxy regarding the supervision of banks
and ﬁnancial markets, with the emergence of neoliberalism (Abdelal, 2007; Jabko, 2006).
The failure of the Commission’s proposals shows that if there is, in theory, a logic that
necessitates ﬁnancial regulatory/supervisory union to go along with monetary union, the
situation is much different in practice. The Commission’s project indeed seemed doomed to
failure in the 1960s. Limited cross-border capital movements, fragmented banking systems
and structural differences in national political economies made a ‘banking union’ as a political
construct difﬁcult to implement, in spite of its theoretical soundness from an EMU perspec-
tive. The context radically changed in the 2000s, when the introduction of the single currency
unleashed new material and political forces that rendered banking union necessary. The crea-
tion of a regulatory/supervisory framework proved impossible ex ante, but necessary ex post.
While the various elements outlined above underscore the continuities of the difﬁculties en-
countered in the evolution of European ﬁnancial integration in the past 50 to 60years, they also
highlight two discontinuities. They ﬁrst contribute to stressing how much of a radical change
the inception of the SSM has been; it is European economic integration’s biggest step since
the creation of the euro. Indeed, however ambitious, the Commission’s early proposals about
a European ‘banking union’ never set out to create a supranational supervisory framework in
the EEC. Second, the context of the 1960s and 1970s – namely, limitations though rising
movements of capital, multiple currencies, no or limited public deﬁcit and debt levels –meant
that the disagreements between EEC countries mattered less than they do today. Theymattered
to the extent that they prevented the European Commission from completing its plans, and thus
creating some sort of banking union prior to the creation of a single currency; but today such
disagreements are so serious as to put at risk the ﬁnancial stability of the eurozone.
Finally, it is worth noting that the question of the general public’s understanding of these
often extremely technical issues was present about 40years ago, as it is today. The European
Commission explicitly raised this problem as early as in 1981, when Tugendhat explained:
‘Our plans may be technically all right. They may ﬁt into the present economic context. But
our chances of realising them will be slim if we seem to be approaching the problem merely
in a technocratic way or as a routine matter. Our ideas will only “sell”, to use a marketing
expression, if we can prove their political and social utility. We should, therefore, think of
the broader context of what we are trying to achieve’ (Tugendhat, 1981). This challenge
has undoubtedly remained central to European policy-making up to the present day.
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